题目：Costly Signaling in E-Commerce Markets: Empirical Evidence from A Quasi-Experiment on Taobao.com

时间：6月4日下午2:00

地点：腾讯会议（会议号：853 355 951；密码：3931）

汇报人：邱杰宏博士

汇报人简介：

邱杰宏，美国华盛顿州立大学经济学博士，研究方向为：应用计量经济学与大数据，实证产业组织。贝业思数据智能技术服务有限公司联合创始人，目前担任数据科学家职务。

摘要：Reputation systems in e-commerce markets are widely adopted to mitigate information asymmetries, but instead they undermine market competition because new sellers are unlikely to sell their products. In this paper we study how signaling mechanisms can be employed by e-commerce markets to fix the drawback of reputation systems. Guided by a dynamic signaling theory, we compile data from the largest e-commerce market in China to examine the treatment effects of signaling programs on transactions under three scenarios: different signaling costs, different product values and different reputation ratings. The theoretical and empirical findings of the paper indicate the following requirements for an efficient signaling mechanism which can facilitate transactions of new sellers in an e-commerce market: 1. the reputation system of the market can generate reliable customer reviews; 2. the product value is high; 3. the signaling cost is high, especially for low-reputation sellers; and 4. the signaling cost and the status of taking signaling actions are factored in ranking the display order of sellers.

欢迎感兴趣的师生参加！